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Abstract: In order to take profit from the differences in factor endowments and tech-
nology that exist between countries, firms delocalize or externalize a share of their goods’
production process to other countries. This phenomenon is so widespread today that very
few manufactured goods are produced entirely within the borders of a single country. We
examine in this paper the macroeconomic gains related to this phenomenon by calculating
the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade. To do so, we
propose a model that allows us to identify all the components related to international
fragmentation in these welfare gains, something that most of the classical trade models
fail to do. We show that the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains
of trade represents on average 22% of the gains of trade, a way lower figure than the
share that could be inferred from standard trade models. The shutdown of international
fragmentation would, therefore, only reduce the average real wage by 3%.
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1 Introduction
In 2018, the WTO reported that trade in manufactured goods represented 68 % of world
trade, far ahead primary goods like agricultural and fuel and mining products. In the
current era of global supply chains, few countries carry out the production process of
these goods from the upstream to the downstream. Rather, the process is fragmented
between a lot of countries so that each one is specialized on particular tasks that are
realized with the highest degree of efficacy, provided that the gains from fragmentation
exceed the costs. It means that before a good reaches its final destination, it could cross
the border of a country as many times as required for the completion of the production
process.
As international fragmentation is a widespread phenomenon today, there is no doubt
that its gains exceed its costs whenever it occurs because otherwise, companies would
be losing money. These gains, however, could be under threat in the current context
marked by a protectionist temptation, notably in the United states since the election
of Donald Trump as President. The ongoing trade war launched by this president with
China have seen tariffs hikes from both sides. This could have detrimental consequences
on vertical specialization between the two countries because as Yi (2003) for instance have
demonstrated, a small variation in tariffs can have magnified and non-linear effects on the
growth of trade and especially on vertically specialized goods.
Since, vertically specialized goods cross the borders of many countries or could cross the
border of a single country several times, the impact of a one-percentage-point tariff reduc-
tion on their trade is logically amplified. A tariff increase, however, as it is currently done
by both countries could possibly render vertical specialization economically unsustainable
between them. It is therefore interesting to determine the welfare reduction that would
imply such a situation.
From a microeconomic standpoint, it is straightforward to determine the net gains of
international fragmentation because companies are able to identify what they earn by
delocalizing or externalizing a share of their production process to other countries. From a
macroeconomic standpoint however, the answer to this question is a bit more complicated.
A solution to provide an answer to this question is to calculate the welfare gains of trade
with a model that takes into account the fragmented organization of the world production
process and make the difference with the gains predicted by a model that does not. This
difference would represent the share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains
of trade. It should be understood that the model that assumes no production linkages
between countries should be a model where each unit of final good is produced using only
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value-added of the producing country and should therefore be calibrated on data that
reflect this reality for the calculation to be reliable.
In principle, any trade model that allows for tradable intermediate inputs takes into
account in a certain way the fragmented organization of the world production network.
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) using trade models featuring two different market
structures, notably perfect and monopolistic competition, calculate the welfare gains of
trade in two cases where trade in intermediate goods is allowed and not. They find that
the welfare gains of trade are almost twice as high when trade in intermediate goods is
allowed than without, suggesting that the share of fragmentation in the welfare gains of
trade is 50% of the total gains.
However, as explained earlier, for this calculation to be reliable, the models without trade
in intermediate goods should have been calibrated on final goods trade data where each
unit of final good is obtained only with value-added of the producing country. Instead
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) calibrate their model using actual trade data that do
not satisfy this requirement. We label the share obtained by performing this calculation
the gross share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade, which is the
gross share of the gains related to trade in intermediate goods. We use the term gross
because it is obvious that the model which is supposed to be without intermediate goods
in fact hides a component of the impact of international fragmentation in the welfare
gains of trade.
To provide a reliable estimation of the net share of international fragmentation in the
welfare gains of trade, we propose a model that allows us to identify in these gains all the
components related to international fragmentation such that this net share be identified.
It is a model that is based upon value-added trade flows rather than gross trade flows.
Gross trade flows are trade statistics that are obtained by recording the value of goods
crossing a country’s borders. This strategy renders difficult the identification of the true
country of origin and the destination of final consumption of a good, especially in presence
of international fragmentation. Value-added trade flows however, which are obtained
through a specific statistical transformation1 identify the value-added of each country
incorporated in the goods and services that are produced and exported worldwide. Unlike
bilateral gross exports that depend only on direct bilateral trade costs, a given country
value-added exports to a particular destination depend on intermediate countries final
goods exports to this destination, and therefore, on intermediate countries trade costs
with it Koopman et al. (2014).
1 see Daudin et al. (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012), or Koopman et al. (2014)
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Standard trade models2 do not take into account this more complex structure of value-
added exports and thus, are not suitable to explain this kind of trade flows. Authors such
as Noguera (2012) or Aichele and Heiland (2018) have already proposed a structural model
for value-added exports, but none of them derive the welfare formula for the gains of trade
with their models. To our knowledge, no other papers rely explicitly upon value-added
exports to do so.
Theoretically, it should be noted that the welfare gains of trade are not supposed to be
different with a value-added exports model in comparison to a gross exports model, as the
economy’s total expenditures remain the same in the two approaches. In fact as value-
added trade flows are obtained by a statistical transformation of gross trade flows, we
need to specify a full gross trade flows model to get our value-added trade flows model.
The gross trade flows model that we specify is close to Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Caliendo and Parro (2015).
However, these two models assume implicitly that the share of a given origin country in
the total demand of inputs by firms in a destination country is also the share of this origin
country in the destination country total demand of final goods. This assumption is not
confirmed by the data. To solve this problem, we specify a different model for the two
kinds of trade as Alexander (2017). Unlike the latter though who assumes that the market
structure for both trade in intermediate and final goods is perfect competition, we assume
that only trade in intermediate goods is based upon perfect competition while for trade
in final goods, we assume that consumers have a "love of variety-like" utility function and
consume all the varieties produced and exported by each country in the world.
Using a value-added exports model rather than a gross exports model to infer the welfare
gains of trade allows us to identify what we labelled earlier the gross share of interna-
tional fragmentation in the welfare gains, but also allows us to identify what we label the
macroeconomic cost of fragmentation. This cost is the accumulated cost that appears
when intermediate goods go back and forth between countries before reaching the coun-
try of final transformation. It is the hidden component of the impact of international
fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade that we mentioned earlier, which is critical to
calculate the net share of fragmentation in these gains.
Besides, this model also allows us to determine the real implications of a trade costs
reduction on a given country’s participation in the global supply chain. This is also
2 By standard trade models we refer to models with Armington utility functions such as the one of
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) or models with perfect and monopolistic competition as market
structures such as the one of Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Chaney (2008) respectively.
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worthy of interest because, as many countries anticipate that participating more in the
global value chain will foster their exports and GDP growth, a lot of them are devising
policies in order to stimulate their integration into the world production process. Among
these policies, reducing the level of trade costs is one of the top priorities.
Our results show that a reduction in the bilateral trade costs of a given country with each
of its trading partners unambiguously increase in absolute terms its participation in the
global supply chain whether backward or forward but, could imply relatively less forward
participation. In fact, the origin country could become more efficient at exporting final
goods to the country of final consumption than exporting intermediate goods to inter-
mediate countries which are then transformed before being exported to the destination
of final consumption. This results in more final goods directly exported to a particular
destination of final consumption by the origin country than intermediate goods indirectly
exported to this particular destination embedded in intermediate countries final goods
exports, which means a relatively lower forward participation.
Moreover, we show that the change in welfare that would imply a move to autarky is
different when estimated using our model rather than a model that does not distinguish
trade in intermediate and final goods. Specifically, it appears similarly to the findings of
Fally and Hillberry (2018) or Alexander (2017) that downstream countries feature higher
welfare gains than upstream countries compared to what predicts a classical model.
We finally show that the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains
from trade represents 22% of the gains of trade, a way lower figure than the gross share
that we inferred from Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). The structure of the paper is
as follows. The second section describes the model, the third and fourth sections present
respectively the data with their different sources and the results of our estimations, and
the last section concludes.
2 The model
The presentation of the model is organized in three sub-sections. In the first, we describe
how goods and value-added are produced and traded between countries. In the following,
we derive the welfare formula that is used to infer the gains from trade against autarky
and in the third we present the method used to infer the change in the welfare gains
related to any trade costs shock other than a move to autarky.
While trade in goods implies a bilateral relationship between the origin country of the
goods and the country of destination, trade in value-added involves a set of other actors
that we label intermediate countries which is the set of countries through which the value-
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added of the origin country passes to reach its final destination. Let “i”, “s” and “j” be
any three countries in the set of countries N. Throughout this model, we use indices “i”
and “j” alternatively for the origin country and the destination country of the trade flows.
When it comes to trade in value-added, we use index s ∈ S for the intermediate countries.
It is worth to note that the set of origin countries, the set of destination countries and
the set of intermediate countries are composed of the same countries which means that a
country can be simultaneously origin, destination and intermediate.
2.1 Production
To produce a unit of good either intermediate or final, a given country combines labor
with intermediate inputs coming from itself and other countries. We assume that the
production technology takes the form of the following Cobb-Douglas function:
qj (ω) = zj (ω) lj (ω)
αj mj(ω)
1−αj (1)
Where zj (ω) represents country “j” efficiency at producing good ω, lj (ω) is labor,
mj(ω) represents the composite intermediate inputs used in order to produce good ω
and where αj is the share of labor required to produce a unit of good in country “j”. We
assume that countries do not have the same access to technology but also that producing
a given good implies a specific technology requirement. zj (ω), therefore, vary by country
and by good.
Following (1), the total quantity of output produced in the economy is given by:
Qj =
∫ 1
0
qj (ω)dω (2)
2.2 Trade in intermediate goods
In order to get the composite intermediate inputs, producers purchase intermediate goods
from suppliers across all countries at the lowest price possible and aggregate them accord-
ing to the following production technology:
Ij =
[∫ 1
0
kj(ω)
ε−1
ε dω
] ε
ε−1
(3)
Where Ij is the total quantity of composite intermediate inputs produced in country “j”
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and used to produce either intermediate or final goods3, kj(ω) is country “j” demand
of input ω and ε the elasticity of substitution across inputs. As in Caliendo and Parro
(2015), the solution to the intermediate input producer problem is thus given by:
kj (ω) =
(
pj(ω)
Pj
)−ε
Ij (4)
With Pj =
[∫ 1
0
pj(ω)
1−ε
dω
] 1
1−ε
(5)
Pj is the unit price of the composite intermediate input in country “j” and pj(ω) the price
at which is bought intermediate input ω by country “j”.
Let pij (ω) be the price of producing and exporting input ω from country “i” to country
“j”. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), this price is given by:
pij (ω) =
(
ci
zi(ω)
)
tij (6)
Where ci
zi(ω)
represents the unitary cost for producing input ω in country “i” with ci the
cost of a bundle of production factors which is the same for each input as we assume the
production factors to be mobile across activities within a country and zi(ω) country “i”
efficiency at producing input ω as in equation (1). tij represents the bilateral trade cost
factor between country “i” and country “j”. This trade cost factor is composed of iceberg
costs and ad-valorem flat rate tariffs4. It is such that the internal trade cost of a country
be equal to unity (tii = 1). Assuming that bilateral barriers obey the triangle inequality
because of cross-border arbitrage, we have for any three countries “i”, “j”, “s”, tij ≤ tistsj.
The price of a given input is therefore:
pj (ω) = min {pij (ω) ; i = 1, . . . , N}
With N being the number of countries. We use the same probabilistic representation of
technologies as proposed by Eaton and Kortum (2002). More precisely, we assume that
country “i” efficiency in producing input ω, zi (ω) is the realization of a random variable
3 We have Ij =
∫ 1
0
mj (ω)dω =
∫
1
0
pj(ω)kj(ω)dω
Pj
with
∫ 1
0
pj (ω) kj (ω)dω= IjPj the budget constraint of the
intermediate good producer.
4 It is worth to mention that our dataset does not provide data on ad-valorem tariffs. To perform our
counterfactual analysis, we will calibrate them using actual data on tariff revenues and bilateral trade
flows.
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Zi drawn for each input independently from its country-specific probability distribution.
This probability distribution is Fi (z) = Pr [Zi ≤ z] which is also by the law of large
numbers the fraction of inputs for which country i’s efficiency is below z. Assuming a
Fréchet distribution, we have:
Fi (z) = e
Υiz
−θ
(7)
Where Υi > 0 is a country-specific state of technology parameter whose value indicates the
likeliness of a good efficiency draw. The bigger its value, the higher the likeliness of a good
efficiency draw for any input ω. θ > 1, the shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution is
not country specific. As explained by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the higher its value the
lesser is the variability of efficiency draws within the countries. This parameter therefore
regulates the heterogeneity of efficiencies across inputs in the countries. It follows that
the probability piij that country “i” provides an input at the lowest price in country “j” is
5:
piij =
Υi (citij)
−θ
Φj
(8)
This probability is the same regardless of the type input. It also represents the share of
country “i” in the total demand of inputs by firms in country “j”. Let Hj be this demand
exclusive of intermediate goods imports tariff revenues such that Hj = (Ij ∗ Pj) − R
I
j
where RIj represents tariff revenues on intermediate goods.
The value of country “j” bilateral demand of inputs or intermediate goods from country
“i” exclusive of intermediate goods imports tariff revenues6 is therefore:
hij =
Υi (citij)
−θ
Φj
Hj (9)
With Φj =
n∑
i=1
Υi (citij)
−θ (10)
Φj is a parameter of the composite intermediate input price in country “j”. Assuming
as Eaton and Kortum (2002) that ε < 1+ θ for the price index to be well defined, we
5 For more details, see Eaton and Kortum (2002)
6 We need intermediate goods imports exclusive of tariff revenues because it is what is required to obtain
the input requirements matrix necessary for the calculation of value-added exports.
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get the exact price index from equation (5) and the distribution of pj (ω) implied by the
assumptions made earlier, which gives7:
Pj = γ
(
N∑
i=j
Υi (citij)
−θ
)−1
θ
(11)
Where γ =
[
Γ
(
1−ε+ θ
θ
)] 1
1−ε with Γ the gamma function.
The cost of a bundle of production factors ci net of export trade costs is then given by:
ci = ζi wi
αi Pi
1−αi (12)
Where wi is the nominal wage in country “i” and ζi = αi
−αi 1−αi
αi−1 a constant.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Caliendo and Parro (2015) assume implicitly that piij, the
share of country “i” in the total demand of inputs by firms in country “j” (8) is also the
share of country “i” in country “j” total demand of final goods. This is because piij in
their framework is the share of goods (not only intermediate goods as in our model but
also final goods) imported from country “i” by country “j” in its total demand but also
the probability that country “i” provides a good at the lowest price in country “j”. Once
again, this probability is the same regardless of the type of good.
As Antràs and De Gortari (2017) suggested, the implicit assumption of these authors is
not confirmed by the data. To solve this problem, Alexander (2017) assumed that for a
given country, the average technology parameter Υi for producing intermediate and final
goods is different. It allows him to stay in this Ricardian framework for modelling trade
in final goods. We do not follow this approach.
Instead, we assume that consumers have a “love of variety-like” utility function which has
different implications in terms of final goods price indexes, trade shares and the trade
elasticity. More precisely, consumers do not necessarily search for the lowest cost supplier
but want to consume all the varieties of goods supplied by each country. This assumption
leads to a different model as regards trade in final goods, a model that is similar to the
standard Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) gravity equation.
7 See Appendix A in Caliendo and Parro (2015) for more details
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2.3 Trade in final goods
Let us define v as a variety of final good produced by country “i”. Country “i” supply of
final goods follows from the production function defined in equation (1):
fi (v) = zi li (v)
αi mi (v)
1−αi (13)
Where fi (v) is the quantity of final goods of variety v produced by country “i”, zi represents
country “i” efficiency at producing a final good which we assume for simplicity to be the
same across final goods, li (v) is labor and mi (v) the composite intermediate inputs used
in order to produce variety v ’ final goods. The cost of producing a unit of good v is such
that :
ci
zi
=
ζi wi
αiPi
1−αi
zi
(14)
Where ci is the cost of a bundle of production factors defined in equation (12). Country
“i” nominal total supply of final goods from is thus given by :
Fi = ci
∫ 1
0
zi li (v)
αi mi (v)
1−αi
zi
dv (15)
Country “j” consumers maximize the following utility function:
(∑
i
β
1−σ
σ
i f
σ−1
σ
ij
) σ
σ−1
(16)
Subject to the budget constraint:
∑
i
pijfij = Xj (17)
Where βi is a positive distribution parameter, fij the consumption of country “i” final
good by country “j” consumers, pij the price of country “i” final good for country “j”
consumers and Xj represents country “j” total demand of final goods inclusive of final
goods tariff revenues (the economy’s total expenditures). We have pij =
ci
zi
tij where the
exporter’s supply price net of trade costs is ci
zi
as in equation (14) and tij the trade cost
factor between “i” and “j”. The nominal value of country “i” final goods imports from
“j” inclusive of tariff revenues is therefore pijfij. A simple maximization of the utility
function under the budget constraint yields:
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pijfij =
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
∑
i(β¨icitij)
1−σ
∑
i pijfij with β¨i =
βi
zi
In order to determine value-added exports flows as we do in the following section, we need
final goods imports exclusive of tariff revenues. Let us define country “i” bilateral imports
of final goods from “j” exclusive of tariff revenues as xij =
pijfij
1+τFij
with τFij representing the
bilateral ad-valorem flat rate tariff for final goods imports. We will get:
xij =
(
β¨icitij
)1−σ
Ej
P Fj
1−σ (18)
Where Ej =
∑
s
pijfij
1+τFij
is country “j” demand of final goods exclusive of final goods tariff
revenues and :
P Fj =
(∑
i
(
β¨icitij
)1−σ) 11−σ
(19)
P Fj is, therefore, the price index of final goods in country “j”. The market clearing condition
implies that country “i” total supply of final goods is also equal to follows from equation
(18) and is given by Fi =
∑
j xij. As it should be clear now, this supply of final goods is
as total output composed of value-added from different origins, be it local or foreign, so
as bilateral exports of final goods. If we are interested in bilateral value-added exports
which are exports that embed only value-added from local origin, a different model should
be used.
2.4 Trade in value-added
We can determine the amount of value-added that a given country exports to its trading
partners including itself as a function of the total supply of final goods. This amount is
equivalent to its GDP. Let us define αis as the fraction of country “i” GDP required by
country “s” in order to produce a unit of final good. The GDP of country “i” is equal to
the sum of the value-added that it provides to each country “s” including itself. We have:
wiLi = (
S∑
s=i
αisFs) (20)
As each country “s” exports its final goods to the countries of final consumption including
itself, we can also determine the value-added exported by a given origin country “i” to a
given destination of final consumption “j”. As shown in equation (21), it is the sum of
11
the value-added originated in “i” that is firstly sent to intermediate countries “s ∈ S” for
transformation into final goods before being sent to the country of final consumption “j”.
vij = (
S∑
s=i
αisXsj) (21)
Where vij represents bilateral value-added exports from country “i” to country “j”
8, Xsj
defined as in equation (18) represents final goods exports from country “s” to country “j”
and αis as said earlier is the fraction of country “i” GDP required by country “s” in order
to produce a unit of final good.
Note that the set S includes the origin country “i” and the destination country “j”. Hence,
when i = s country “i” exports directly its value-added to country “j”. When i 6= s ,
country “i” exports indirectly its value-added to country “j” via the other intermediate
countries’ final goods exports to “j”. When s = j, country “i” exports its value added to
the destination of final consumption “j”, but this value-added is transformed in final good
in “j” before consumption.
By combining equation (18) and equation (21), it follows that:
vij =
S∑
s=i
(
β¨scstsj
)1−σ
Ej
P Fj
1−σ αis
=
(
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
Ej
PFj
1−σ αii
)
+
(∑S
s 6=i
(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
Ej
PFj
1−σ αis
)
⇒ vij=
(
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
Ej
PFj
1−σ αii
) (β¨icitij)
1−σ
Ej
PF
j
1−σ αii+
∑S
s 6=i
(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
Ej
PF
j
1−σ αis
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
Ej
PF
j
1−σ αii

=
(
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
Ej
PFj
1−σ
)( ∑S
s=i αis(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(βicitij)
1−σ
)
⇒ vij =

(
β¨icitijtiSj
)1−σ
Ej
P Fj
1−σ
 (22)
8 It is straightforward to see that wiLi =
∑S
s=i
∑
j αisXsj
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Where tiSj =

∑S
s=i αis
(
β¨scstsj
)1−σ
(
β¨icitij
)1−σ

1
1−σ
(23)
This term tiSj is a function of the weighted relative price between the indirectly exported
flows by the origin country “i” to the destination country “j” through intermediate countries
“s ∈ S” over the directly exported flows by the origin country “i” to the destination
country “j”. Besides, we can see that equation (22) is nothing more than the Anderson
and Van Wincoop’s gravity equation scaled by this term tiSj that we label “the cost of
fragmentation”.
As bilateral trade costs, this term exerts a negative effect on bilateral value-added ex-
ports. However, it decreases with the amount of value added exported as input by the
origin country to intermediate countries, that is to say
∂tiSj
∂αis
< 0. It means that the more
a country exports its intermediate inputs to a given destination’s main providers of final
goods, the lesser its cost of fragmentation will be and the higher will be its indirectly ex-
ported flows to this destination, comparatively to a country that exports less intermediate
inputs to the said providers of final goods. Consequently, upstream countries, that are
countries with a high forward participation in a given chain of production undergo a low
cost of fragmentation, whereas the most downstream countries that have a low forward
participation in comparison to the previous but a higher backward participation undergo
a higher cost of fragmentation and, therefore, export more directly their goods to final
consumers9.
tiSj therefore, measures the proximity of country “i” to the final consumers in country “j”.
10
The lower it is, the further away is the origin country from the final consumer. It implies
higher indirectly exported flows to the country of final consumption. On the contrary,
the higher it is, the closer is the origin country from the final consumer. The indirectly
exported flows are, therefore, lesser and exports of final goods are higher. As equation
(23) shows, tiSj depends critically on αis which is the fraction of country “i” value-added
required by country “s” in order to produce a unit of final good. The latter is obtained
using input-output analysis. More precisely, we have:
αis = αi ∗Bis (24)
9 Direct exports of goods to final consumers refer to final goods exports.
10Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012) also proposed indexes to measure the distance of industries to
final demand or the average position of countries in global supply chains.
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Where αi =
wiLi
Gi
is the share of GDP (total value-added) in total output, and where Bis
is the quantity of output sourced by country “s” from country “i” in order to produce a
unit of final good. It is thus an element of the input requirements matrix also known
as the Leontief inverse matrix. Let A be the input-coefficient matrix obtained from an
input-output table with
hij
Gj
as elements; hij being the value of country “i” bilateral supply
of intermediate goods to country “j” and Gj the nominal output of country “j” such that :
Gj =
∫ 1
0
cj
zj(ω)
qj(ω)dω (25)
=
∫ 1
0
ζj (wjlj(ω))
αj (Pjmj(ω))
1−αj dω
The Leontief inverse is given by B = (ID − A)−1 with ID being an identity matrix.
From matrix algebra, we know that ID = (ID − A)−1 (ID − A). If we define IDij as
an element of the identity matrix, it follows that the Leontief inverse can be obtained by
solving:
IDij =
S∑
s=1
Bis
(
IDsj −
hsj
Gj
)
(26)
2.5 Total expenditures and trade balance
Let us set country “j” for the sake of presentation as the benchmark country in this section.
The economy’s total expenditures Xj are given by the following equation:
Xj = wjLj +Rj + Dj (27)
Xj also represents the final absorption of country “j” which is the sum of labor income
wjLj, tariff revenues Rj and the trade deficit Dj; where Rj = R
I
j +R
F
j is the sum of tariff
revenues on intermediate goods RIj and final goods R
F
j and labor income is also the sum
of value-added exports such that wjLj =
∑
j vji =
∑S
s=j
∑
i αjsXsi.We have:
RIj =
∑
i
τ Iij hij (28)
RFj =
∑
i
τFij xij (29)
With τ Iij and τ
F
ij representing the bilateral ad-valorem flat-rate tariffs respectively for
intermediate and final goods imports.
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Dj =
∑
i (hij + xij) −
∑
i (hji + xji) is the difference between total imports of inter-
mediate and final goods and total exports. As Caliendo and Parro (2015) we assume the
country’s trade deficit to be exogeneous in this model and the sum of trade deficits across
countries to be equal to zero.
The economy’s total expenditures Xj are also given by Xj = Ej + R
F
j where Ej as said
earlier is country “j” total demand of final goods exclusive of final goods tariff revenues.
It follows that:
Ej = wjLj + R
I
j + Dj (30)
In equilibrium, the country total supply of goods Gj which is defined in equation (25)
should be equal to the total expenditures excluding tariff revenues of the economy, final
goods and intermediate goods included, minus the trade deficit. We thus have:
Gj = Hj + Ej −Dj (31)
where Hj is the total demand of intermediate goods exclusive of intermediate goods tariff
revenues. Writing equation (31) differently, we would get:
Gj = Hj +R
I
j + Ej +R
F
j −Rj −Dj (32)
We can directly see from equation (30) that Ej + R
F
j − Rj −Dj = wjLj is by definition
the GDP of country “j”. We thus get:
Gj = Hj +R
I
j + wjLj (33)
Moreover, in equilibrium, a given country’s total supply of goods should be equal to the
total expenditures (excluding tariff payments) of all the countries in the world on goods
from this given country. Using equation (33) as the definition of country “j” total supply
of goods which is equivalent to equation (25), it follows that:
∑
i
hij
(
1 + τ Iij
)
+ wjLj =
∑
i
(hji + xji) (34)
In appendix 6.C, I represent these equations in an inter-country input-output table.
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2.6 Welfare predictions
In trade theory, welfare is generally defined as the real expenditures of the economy. It
is represented in this work by
Xj
PFj
where Xj, given by equation (27) is the nominal value
of the economy’s total expenditures and P Fj given by equation (19) is the price index
of final goods. This variable, thus, depends on tariff revenues and trade imbalances. A
lot of static models11, however, generally assume that there are no trade imbalances and
abstract from tariff revenues, which implies that the welfare variable depends only on
the real wage. In this model, we allow for trade imbalances and assume that they are
lump-sum transfers which remain unchanged between the initial and the counterfactual
equilibrium as suggested by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and following Caliendo
and Parro (2015). Nevertheless, to ensure comparability with the above-mentioned static
models and for simplicity, we will focus on analyzing the real wage and especially the
change in real wage following a trade shock as our measure of welfare, given that the real
wage should be the same regardless of trade imbalances.
To determine this real wage, we firstly combine the trade equation for a given country’s
intermediate goods internal flows (equation (8)), with equations (11) and (12) representing
respectively the price index for intermediate goods and the unit cost of production. This
allows us to obtain the nominal wage. Then, the relevant price index which is the price
of final goods is obtained by rearranging equation (18), the final goods trade equation, in
order to express it in terms of trade data. We have with tjj = 1 :(
pijjΦj
Υj
)−1
θ
= cj = ζj wj
αj pj
1−αj
=⇒ wj
αj = 1
ζj
(
γΦj
−1
θ
)αj−1 (pijjΦj
Υj
)−1
θ
=⇒ wj =
(
1
ζj
) 1
αj
(γ)
αj−1
αj
(
pijjΦj
αj
Υj
) −1
θαj
(35)
We also have from equation (18):
=⇒ P Fj =
β¨jcj
λjj
1
1−σ
=
β¨j
λjj
1
1−σ
(
pijjΦj
Υj
)−1
θ
(36)
Where λjj =
xjj
Ej
11See for instance Fally and Hillberry (2018), Alexander (2017), Arkolakis et al. (2012), Eaton and Kortum
(2002)
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Combining equation (35) and (36), we get the following real wage equation:
wj
P Fj
=
(
1
ζj
) 1
αj
(γ)
αj−1
αj
(
pijj
Υj
)−1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)(
λjj
β¨j
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
(37)
This equation is in many regards similar to the real wage formula that we would get
from a standard one sector Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Armington model with tradable
intermediate goods. Precisely, it must be assumed for the formulas to be equivalent
that the share of intermediate goods sourced locally in the total demand of intermediate
goods is the same as the share of final goods sourced locally in the total demand of final
goods but also that trade elasticities are the same regardless of the type of trade flows
(intermediate or final goods). If it is the case, there would be no need to model trade in
final goods differently than trade in intermediate goods, and we could get the real wage
by dividing the nominal wage in equation (37) with the price index of intermediate goods
in equation (11). This would give:
wj
Pj
= (γζj)
−1
αj
(
pijj
Υj
) −1
θαj
(38)
=⇒
wj
Pj
= (γζj)
−1
αj
(
pijj
Υj
)−1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)(
pijj
Υj
)−1
θ
(39)
It is the same real wage equation determined by Eaton and Kortum (2002) 12
Thus, assuming that the share of intermediate goods sourced locally in the total demand
of intermediate goods is equivalent to the share of final goods sourced locally in the total
demand of final goods, an assumption non consistent with trade data, have implications
as Alexander (2017) already showed on the welfare gains of trade. The results section will
make it clear.
We could also derive equation (37) using value-added trade flows instead of final goods
trade flows. Theoretically, this should not modify the real wage value as the price index
of final goods is not supposed to change between the two models. Using equation (22),
we can express the price of final goods in terms of value-added trade data as following:
P Fj =
β¨jcjtjSj
λjjva
1
1−σ
=
β¨jtjSj
λjjva
1
1−σ
(
pijjΦj
Υj
)−1
θ
(40)
12See equation 15 in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
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Where λjjva =
vjj
Dj
=⇒
wj
P Fj
=
(
1
ζj
) 1
αj
(γ)
αj−1
αj
(
pijj
Υj
)−1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)(
λjjva
β¨j
1−σ
tjSj
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
(41)
The condition required for equation (37) and equation (41) to be equal is that λjj =
λjjva
tjSj
1−σ
i.e. that the ratio of the share of internal trade in value-added over the internal cost of
fragmentation be equal to the share of final goods internal trade. As we will see in the
data section, this condition is met.
It appears as (37) and (41) show that the real wage decreases with internal trade be it
internal trade in intermediate goods pijj , internal trade in final goods λjj or internal trade
in value-added λjjva, but increases with technology Υj. We can also see that it decreases
with the trade cost of fragmentation tjSj. As said earlier tjSj summarizes the production
linkages of the origin country with all the indirect exporters “s ∈ S” of its value-added. In
this case, the value-added is exported as intermediate inputs in the first step by the origin
country to intermediate countries and exported back to the origin country embedded in
these intermediate countries’ final goods. From this formula, we see which factors can
drive a given country’s welfare gains from a change in trade costs for example. Expressing
(41) in relative change assuming ζj, Υj and β¨j to be constant across equilibria gives:
ln
ŵj
P̂j
=
−1
θ
(
1− αj
αj
)
ln pijj −
1
σ − 1
ln λ̂jjva − ln t̂jSj (42)
Where a variable with a hat, for instance X̂ represents the relative change of the variable
between an initial and a counterfactual equilibrium such that X̂=X
,
X
with X the variable
in the initial equilibrium and X , the variable in the counterfactual equilibrium.
Consider for example a reduction in the level of a given country’s bilateral trade costs on
imports and exports with its trading partners. This shock would reduce the import price
of its intermediate inputs, which is the source of the first gain. In this case, the share of
internal trade in intermediate goods pijj decreases between the initial and the counterfac-
tual equilibrium because more intermediate inputs are imported from other countries as
a result of the decrease in bilateral trade costs. −1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)
ln pijj which represents the first
source of gains is thus positive. The second source of change in the gains, 1
1−σ
ln λ̂jjva, is
also affected positively by the decrease in the level of bilateral trade costs. In fact, the
share of value-added exported to itself by the given country decreases between the initial
and the counterfactual equilibrium, because more value-added is imported from other
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countries. This implies a positive value of 1
σ−1
ln λ̂jjva and, therefore, a positive change of
the given country real wage.
The last source of change in the gains, ln t̂jSj, is the change in the trade costs undergone
by the given origin country “j” for the inputs exported to its partners or intermediate
countries (s ∈ S), and that are exported back by them to “j” embedded in their final
goods. In autarky, this term is equal to one, the lower bound trade cost when a country
trades with itself. It means that decreasing the level of bilateral trade costs should have
a positive impact on this variable and therefore, exert a negative impact on the welfare
gains change.
This last source of gains as explained earlier appears in the welfare formula because of
the use of the value-added trade equation to determine the price index. Had we used the
final goods trade equation that it would have been captured by the gains related to trade
in final goods so that : 1
σ−1
ln λ̂jjva − ln t̂jSj =
1
σ−1
ln λ̂jj. It follows that this approach
based on value-added exports allows us to determine the net share of the welfare gains
that can be attributed to international fragmentation. This is because we identify the
impact of being able to import and export cheap intermediate inputs on the change in real
wage −1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)
ln pijj and also the indirect cost implied by this international organization
of production − ln t̂jSj. With a standard trade model à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) or
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) with tradable intermediate goods, we would not be
able to do so because we could only identify 1
σ−1
ln λ̂jj which embeds − ln t̂jSj as explained
earlier. We define the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade
as following:
ln
ŵj
P̂j
F
=
−1
θ
ln pijj − ln t̂jSj
ln
ŵj
P̂j
(43)
Consider for example the hypothetical situation of a move to autarky for country “j”.
−1
θ
(
1−αj
αj
)
ln pijj on one hand that would be negative, represents the log change in real
wage related to the fact that country “j” could not anymore source cheap inputs from other
countries in order to produce its final goods. On the other hand, − ln t̂jSj which would be
positive represents the log change in real wage related to the trade costs that country “j”
would not have to undergo anymore to send its inputs to intermediate countries before
re-importing them embedded in final goods or intermediate inputs used in the production
of its final goods. With a one stage production process the log change in real wage would
simply be − 1
σ−1
ln λ̂jjva where λjjva, the share of domestic expenditures on value-added
would be equal to the share of domestic expenditures on final goods (18).
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In this regard, our results share similarities with the model of Fally and Hillberry (2018)
who proposed a sequential model of global supply chains. More precisely, they proposed
a welfare formula for a two-country case with one country upstream, the other one down-
stream, and they showed that the welfare gains in presence of fragmentation are lower
than without for the upstream country and higher for the downstream country. This is
due to the fact that the upstream country re-imports its previously exported inputs to
the downstream one embedded in the latter final goods exports. As this amounts to an
indirect export to oneself and that welfare decreases with internal trade, this result is
totally sensical. The downstream country however does not export inputs whatsoever in
their framework, but sources some of its inputs from the upstream one, everything that
increases its welfare.
Their welfare formula is, therefore, suitable to analyze the net welfare gains of interna-
tional fragmentation, but ours is more general because it works also for a “more than
two country-case” where both upstream and downstream countries import and export
intermediate inputs.
2.7 Counterfactual analysis
Different kind of trade costs shocks are often envisaged to determine the welfare gains of
trade. The most commonly used in the literature is a move to autarky.
2.7.1 Autarky
It is straightforward to see that one does not need to solve the full general equilibrium
model to get the change in real wage as in autarky, the internal trade shares and the
internal cost of fragmentation would be equal to 1.
From equation (42), It follows that the welfare formula (the log change in real wage) after
a move to autarky is given by:
W =
1
θ
(
1− αj
αj
)
ln pijj +
1
σ − 1
lnλjjva + ln tjSj (44)
Something interesting to mention is that we don’t need to calculate the internal cost of
fragmentation tjSj as it could be straightforwardly approximated through the data. We
can see this from equation (23) which defines the cost of fragmentation.
tjSj=
( ∑S
s=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
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=⇒ tjSj=
(
αjj(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
+
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
=⇒ tjSj=
(
αjj +
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
Where
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ represents the ratio of the value-added exported as intermediate
good by “j” to intermediate countries S 6= j and that comes back to “j” embedded in its
final goods imports from the intermediate countries, over the internal trade in final goods
of country “j”. To see this, we can rewrite the ratio as following:
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ =
∑S
s 6=j
αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
Ej
PF
j
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
Ej
PF
j
1−σ
It is straightforward to see that this ratio is negligible as countries tend to trade more with
themselves than with others. Besides, the numerator of the ratio is low by definition as it is
only a tiny fraction (αjs) of the final goods imports from intermediate countries. We show
that in the data section. Thus, the internal cost of fragmentation can be approximated
by:
tjSj ≈ (αjj)
1
1−σ (45)
Where αjj = αj∗Bjj as shown in equation (24) is the fraction of local value-added required
to produce a unit of final good in country “j”, with αj the share of GDP in total output
and Bjj the fraction of local output required to produce a unit of final good in country
“j”. As shows equation (26), Bjj is obtained through the Leontief inverse. These data are
generally observable or could be obtained with minimal transformations.
When the shock is not a move to autarky but an infinitesimal change in trade costs for
example, one needs to solve the full general equilibrium model to get the counterfactual
shares of internal trade and the counterfactual cost of fragmentation. To do so, we follow
the approach of Dekle et al. (2008) which is to solve the model in change and, therefore,
avoid having to calibrate unobservable parameters such as preferences or technology.
2.7.2 Other trade costs shocks
We assume as Caliendo and Parro (2015) that the share of value-added in total output
αj =
wjLj
Gj
is fixed across equilibria as well as technology and preference parameters. It
implies that:
ln ŵj = ln Ĝj (46)
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This change in the nominal wage ln ŵj affects the change in the unit cost of a bundle
of inputs associated to a trade costs shock ln ĉj. Equation (12) states that this cost is
cj = ζj wj
αj Pj
1−αj . The log change is thus equal to:
ln ĉj = αj ln ŵj + (1− αj) ln P̂j (47)
With ln P̂j the change in the intermediate inputs price index given by:
ln
(
P̂j
)
=
−1
θ
ln
(
Φ̂j
)
(48)
The log change in Φj, the intermediate goods price index parameter follows from equation
(10) which states that Φj =
∑N
i=1Υi (citij)
−θ
. It follows that:
ln
(
Φ̂j
)
=
N∑
i=1
hij
Hj
ln
(
ĉitij
)−θ
(49)
Where bilateral imports in intermediate goods, hij =
Υi(citij)
−θHj
Φj
come from equation (9).
Expressed in log change, it gives:
ln ĥij = ln (ĉi)
−θ + ln
(
t̂ij
)−θ
+ ln Ĥj − ln Φ̂j (50)
The change in country “j” total demand of intermediate inputs exclusive of tax ln Ĥj
follows from equation (33), which states that Gj = Hj +R
I
j + wjLj. This implies that:
ln Ĝj =
Hj
Gj
ln Ĥj +
RIj
Gj
ln R̂Ij +
wjLj
Gj
ln ŵj (51)
Where ln R̂Ij , the log change of tariff revenues on intermediate goods follows from equation
(28) with RIj =
∑N
i=1 τ
I
ij hij. In log change, we would have:
ln R̂Ij =
N∑
i=1
τ Iijhij
RIj
ln ĥij (52)
As regards bilateral exports of final goods, equation (18) states that xsj =
(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
Ej
PFj
1−σ ,
which implies in relative change :
ln x̂sj = ln (ĉs)
1−σ + ln
(
t̂sj
)1−σ
+ ln ÊJ − ln
(
P̂ Fj
)1−σ
(53)
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And where the log change of the final goods price index P Fj is given by:
ln
(
P̂ Fj
)1−σ
=
n∑
s=1
xsj
Ej
ln
(
ĉstsj
)1−σ
(54)
The log change of the economy’s total expenditures net of final goods’ tariff revenues
ln ÊJ follows from equation (30) where Ej = wjLj + R
I
j + Dj. We thus get:
ln ÊJ =
wjLj
Ej
ln ŵj +
RIj
Ej
ln R̂Ij +
Dj
Ej
ln D̂j (55)
As mentioned earlier, we assume trade deficits (the difference between imports and ex-
ports) to be exogeneous in this model. It follows that:
ln D̂j = 0 (56)
We now turn to the determination of the log change in bilateral value-added exports.
From equation (22), we know that λijva=
(
β¨icitijtiSj
PFj
)1−σ
with λijva =
vij
Ej
. It implies in log
change:
ln λ̂ijva =(1− σ)
[
ln (̂ci) + ln t̂ij + ln t̂iSj − ln P̂Fj
]
(57)
The change in the cost of fragmentation ln t̂iSj comes from equation (22), (23) and (24).
Specifically:
tiSj=
( ∑S
s=i αis (β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(βicitij)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
and αis = αi ∗Bis
=⇒ d ln tiSj =
1
1−σ
∑S
s=i (1−σ)αiBis

 (β¨scstsj)−σd(β¨scstsj)
(β¨icitij)
1−σ −
(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
d(β¨icitij)
(β¨icitij)
2−σ +
(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
d(αiBis)
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
(1−σ)αiBis


tiSj
1−σ
We know from equation (22) that 1
tiSj
1−σ =
Ej
vij
(
β¨icitij
PFj
)1−σ
=⇒ 1
tiSj
1−σ =
xsj
vij
(
β¨icitij
β¨scs tsj
)1−σ
where P Fj
1−σ
is given by : P Fj
1−σ
=
Ej(β¨scs tsj)
1−σ
xsj
=⇒ ln t̂iSj =
S∑
s=i
αiBisxsj
vij
[
ln (̂cstsj)− ln (̂citij) + ln B̂is
1
(1−σ)
]
(58)
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As we can see, the change in the cost of fragmentation ln t̂iSj depends critically on the
change in the input requirements ln B̂is. From equation (26), we have IDij =
∑S
s=1Bis
(
IDsj −
hsj
Gj
)
where IDij is an element of the identity matrix.
Expressing this equation in change gives:
d IDij =
∑S
s=1
[(
IDsj −
hsj
Gj
)
d Bis +Bis d IDsj −
Bis
Gj
d hsj +
Bishsj
Gj
2 d Gj
]
=⇒ 0 =
∑S
s=1
[(
IDsj −
hsj
Gj
)
d Bis −
Bis
Gj
d hsj +
Bishsj
Gj
2 d Gj
]
=
∑S
s=1
[(
BisIDsj −
Bishsj
Gj
)
d lnBis −
Bishsj
Gj
(d lnhsj − d lnGj)
]
=⇒ 0 =
S∑
s=1
[
(BisIDsj) ln B̂is −
Bishsj
Gj
(
ln ĥsj − ln Ĝj + ln B̂is
)]
(59)
To close the model, we use the equilibrium condition defined in equation (34) which states
that
∑N
i=1 hij
(
1 + τ Iij
)
+ wjLj =
∑N
i=1 (hji + xji). Writing this condition in change gives
the following expression:
N∑
i=1
((
1 + τ Iij
) hij
Gj
ln ĥij +
wjLj
Gj
ln ŵj
)
=
N∑
i=1
(
hji
Gj
ln ĥji +
xji
Gj
ln x̂ji
)
(60)
Equations (46) to (60) represent the set of 15 equations and 15 unknowns that describe
our model in relative change between an initial and a counterfactual equilibrium. As we
can see, solving it requires mostly data that are readily observables with the exception
of the trade elasticities (1 − σ) and −θ. As they play a critical role in determining the
results, we provide a discussion on their calibration in the next section.
Before that, it is interesting to analyze the conditions required for a decrease in the bilat-
eral cost of fragmentation following a decrease in the level of trade costs; which would mean
for the exporting country a higher forward participation in the production network of the
goods bought by the importing country. For this to occur, it is necessary that the impact
of a decrease in the level of trade costs regarding the indirect relationship from the ori-
gin country “i” to the destination of final consumption “j” through intermediate countries
s 6= i ∈ S which is represented by “
∑S
s 6=i
αiBisxsj
vij
[
ln (̂cstsj) + ln B̂is
1
(1−σ)
]
< 0”, be higher
than the impact of trade costs on the direct relationship from the origin country “i” to the
destination country “j” represented by “ αiBii
tiSj
1−σ ln B̂ii
1
(1−σ) +
∑S
s 6=i
αiBisxsj
vij
[
− ln (̂citij)
]
> 0”.
As the change in the elements of the Leontief inverse ln B̂is depends as shown in equation
(59) on the change in intermediate goods trade flows, it follows that the change in the
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cost of fragmentation depends critically on the intermediate goods flows trade elasticity
−θ. Ceteris paribus, the higher the absolute value of this elasticity, the more ln B̂is
1
(1−σ)
would change up to the point where the cost of fragmentation would decrease. However,
the higher (σ − 1), the less ln B̂is
1
(1−σ) would change such that the cost of fragmentation
would increase. Hence, if the trade costs of intermediate countries remain constant, we
can conjecture that a necessary condition for the cost of fragmentation to decrease is that
the trade elasticity for intermediate goods be sufficiently high in comparison to the trade
elasticity for final goods.
It is also straightforward to see that the change in country “j” internal cost of fragmenta-
tion, ln t̂jSj would be equal to ln B̂jj
1
(1−σ) because as shown in equation (45),
αjBjj
tjSj
1−σ ≈ 1
with
∑S
s 6=j
αjBjsxsj
vjj
[
− ln (̂cjtjj)
]
as well as
∑S
s 6=j
αjBjsxsj
vjj
[
ln (̂cstsj) + ln B̂js
1
(1−σ)
]
being
negligible.
We summarize the results of this model as following:
• Classical models implicitly assume that the share of intermediate goods sourced
locally in the total demand of intermediate goods is equivalent to the share of final
goods sourced locally in the total demand of final goods for a given country. As we
relax this assumption, the welfare gains of trade in this model are different.
• Deriving the welfare gains of trade using the value-added exports equation rather
than the gross trade flows equation allows the identification of the net share of
international fragmentation in these welfare gains.
• Calculating the welfare gains of trade against autarky from the value-added trade
equation only requires a supplementary parameter obtained after minimal trans-
formations from observable data on top of the internal trade shares and the trade
elasticities. This parameter is the fraction of local value-added required to produce
a unit of final good in a given country.
• A decrease of a country direct bilateral trade costs, those of intermediate countries
remaining constant implies a move towards downstream stages of the production
process, provided that the trade elasticity for intermediate goods be sufficiently
low.
2.8 Calibration of the trade elasticities
The elasticity of import with respect to variable trade costs generally referred in the lit-
erature as the trade elasticity is a key parameter required to infer the gains from trade.
Hillberry and Hummels (2013) even go so far as to say that it is the most important
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parameter in modern trade theory. Estimating it does not come without difficulties re-
garding notably the identification assumptions, as well explained by the previous authors.
This is why a lot of trade theory practitioners have relied upon off-the-shelf elasticities
provided by the literature. We follow the same path; however, the particularity of our
model imposes us some restrictions.
First of all, as we distinguish between intermediate and final goods trade flows and assume
a specific market structure for the trade in intermediate goods, notably perfect compe-
tition, the trade elasticities have different interpretations for these two kinds of trade.
In a model with perfect competition, the trade elasticity is the shape parameter of the
distribution of productivity. It determines the extensive and the intensive margins of the
change in trade flows following a change in trade costs and is a sufficient parameter along
with the internal trade shares to derive the welfare gains of trade provided that certain
conditions are met. We should therefore use a trade elasticity obtained from a method
that allows the identification of this parameter specifically. Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
or Caliendo and Parro (2015) provide these estimates with a preferred value for the former
equal to 4.14, and an aggregate value for the latter equal to 4.45.
Secondly, as regards trade in final goods, we did not assume perfect competition as the
market structure and derived our model using an Armington utility function. In this
environment, the trade elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
As explained by Simonovska and Waugh (2014), estimations that are based upon the
method of Feenstra (1994) allows the identification of this parameter. Imbs and Mejean
(2015) use this method and find estimates between 2.2 and 54 with an average of 5.4.
Ossa (2015) also provides estimates of this parameter for 251 industries.
Thirdly, it is important to note that we use one sector models for the two kinds of trade,
and as Imbs and Mejean (2015) suggests, for a one sector model to mimic the welfare
gains of trade that a multi sector-model could predict, the trade elasticity should be a
weighted average of sector level elasticities instead of being obtained using aggregated
trade data. Unfortunately, we are not able to perform such a calculation without proper
weights and trade elasticities matching our disaggregated data.
Another point worth to mention is that, it is common in the theoretical literature as
mentioned after equation (10) to assume that the shape parameter of the distribution of
productivity is higher than the elasticity of substitution across goods minus one “ε− 1 <
θ”. Crozet and Koenig (2010) verify empirically this assumption for a set of firms’ data
calibrated upon a model of monopolistic competition. This assumption is critical in our
perfect competition model for the price index to be well defined (See Eaton and Kortum
(2002)).
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Lastly, as Antràs and De Gortari (2017) suggest, the trade elasticity seems to be lower
on average for intermediate inputs than for final goods. The findings of Fally and Hill-
berry (2018) could help understanding this point. They explain that with international
fragmentation, the final goods trade elasticity is higher than without fragmentation. To
illustrate that, they take a two-country case with an upstream and a downstream country,
and explain that a 1% increase in trade costs increases the price of the final goods im-
ported by the upstream country by more than 1% since these goods embeds intermediate
goods previously exported as inputs to the downstream country.
This point seems to be confirmed by the data. To show it, using the work of Ossa (2015)
who provides a set of substitution elasticities for 251 SITC-Rev3 sectors at the 3 digits
level, we calculate the average elasticity for intermediate goods and final goods sectors.
To do so, using a table of concordance between SITC-Rev3 and the UN classification of
goods by end-use (UN-BEC), we select sectors corresponding exclusively to intermediate
goods and final goods taken separately according to the UN BEC-Rev4 classification and
compute the average. We are left with 129 industries for intermediate goods and 32
industries for final goods, with averages that are respectively 3.08 and 4.75.
In sum, the trade elasticity that we should set for intermediate goods trade flows should
be higher than the elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods minus one, but lower
than the elasticity of substitution for final goods minus one such that ε− 1 < θ < σ− 1.
We select the aggregate estimate of Caliendo and Parro (2015) which is obtained using
gross trade flows (final and intermediate goods included) as our benchmark. We do so
because their gravity-based estimation of the trade elasticity can fit with models using
different market structures provided that they can generate a gravity equation. As this
value is equal to 4.45 for all the trade flows combined, we set θ = 4.25 for the intermediate
goods model and σ − 1 = 4.85 for the final goods model.
3 Data
To calculate the net share of fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade, we need a dataset
of value-added trade flows. To obtain these data, we use the GTAP 9 database which is
a multi-country input-output table. The table comprises 140 entities which are countries
or aggregations of countries and 57 sectors that we aggregate into one to simplify the
analysis. Released in 2015, it has 3 base years among which we choose 2011 to carry
out our analysis. We obtained our value-added trade flows data using the methodology
developed by Koopman et al. (2014). As the table is a multi-country table, imports
of intermediate inputs are not broken down by countries of origin just as final demand
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imports. This poses a problem because we need the complete set of bilateral intermediate
and final demand imports in order to calculate each country bilateral value-added exports.
To solve this problem, two solutions are generally used in the literature. Applying a
proportionality assumption which amounts to assume that the imports of intermediate
and final goods of a given country from a particular source are proportional to its total
imports from this source. The second solution is to use the UN BEC classification of
products by end-use category along with the UN COMTRADE database which reports
bilateral exports and imports between countries at the HS 6 digits level, in order to obtain
the share of intermediate and final goods in the exports of a given country to a particular
destination. These shares are then applied to the export data from the GTAP database
to disentangle bilateral exports between intermediate and final goods and calculate the
value-added exports. By disentangling bilateral exports by type, we get a new table which
is an inter-country input output table and that should be consistent with the initial multi-
country input output table.
We decided to choose the second option as it is done in the seminal work of Koopman
et al. (2014). To ensure the consistency between the inter-country and the multi-country
input-output tables, we used the quadratic mathematical programming model formulated
by Tsigas et al. (2012).13
It is worth to note that our value-added exports include both goods and services. We
therefore use the comprehensive database on trade in services of Francois and Pindyuk
(2013) along with a preliminary draft of the UN BEC revision 5 classification by broad
economic categories to perform our calculations. This revision, unlike previous ones,
does a better job at distinguishing goods and services and classifying them by end-use
categories.
Using our reconstructed inter-country input-output table, we calculate the cost of frag-
mentation with the method presented in Njike (2019)14 and the unobservable variables
β¨scs are approximated using the fixed-effects estimates following Fally (2015). In what
follows, we present:
• The relationship between the inverse internal cost of fragmentation tjSj
1−σ and the
13The GAMS code is available upon request
14To calculate the cost of fragmentation tiSj =
( ∑S
s=i αis(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
we need proxies for the bilateral
trade costs indexes (tsj)
1−σ
and the unobservable variables β¨scs . To obtain them, an econometric
estimation with importer and exporter fixed effects is performed on final goods trade flows. We then
predict (tsj)
1−σ
using the specified trade costs function
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fraction of local value-added “αjj” required to produce a unit of final good in a given
country.
• The relationship between internal trade in final goods xjj and the ratio of internal
value-added trade flows over the inverse internal cost of fragmentation
vjj
tjsj1−σ
.
Chart 1 suggests that there is a perfect correlation as mentioned earlier in equation (45)
between the inverse internal cost of fragmentation tjSj
1−σ and the fraction of local value-
added required to produce a unit of final good in a given country ”αjj” that we label
internal total requirement in the left panel of the chart.
Figure 1: Correlation between total requirements and the cost of fragmentation
It appears as the right panel of the chart shows, that there is no correlation when it comes
to non-symmetric relationships i.e. when the exporter is not also the importer. This is
perfectly sensical. To see why, let us analyze again the cost of fragmentation formula:
tiSj =
( ∑S
s=i αis(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨icitij)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
When the exporter is also the importer, we have tjSj=
(
αjj +
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
and we explained in page 18 that the term
∑S
s 6=j αjs(β¨scstsj)
1−σ
(β¨jcjtjj)
1−σ is negligible because the
denominator, internal trade in final goods is very high for all the countries. When the
exporter is not the importer, this denominator is not that high anymore which explains
why the term is no longer negligible.
Chart 2 shows the correlation between bilateral final goods exports “xij” and the ratio of
value-added trade flows over the inverse cost of fragmentation “
vij
tiSj
1−σ ”. This ratio can be
interpreted as the value-added that would have been directly exported by country “i” to
country “j” in the absence of fragmentation. We can see in the upper panel of the chart
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dedicated to internal trade flows that the correlation is perfect. In the lower panel of
the chart related to non-internal trade flows, the correlation is also very high, but not as
perfect as for internal trade flows. This is normal since the inverse cost of fragmentation is
estimated with error. As shown in Njike (2019) it is obtained via gravity-based estimates
of bilateral trade costs.
Figure 2: Correlation between final goods and value-added trade flows
However, given that (tjSj)
1−σ ≈ αjj and that internal value-added trade flows by defi-
nition are given by vjj = Xjj
(
αjj +
∑S
s 6=j αjsXsj
Xjj
)
with
∑S
s 6=j αjsXsj
Xjj
being negligible, the
approximation of trade costs that affects only
∑S
s 6=j αjsXsj
Xjj
has a little impact on tjSj
1−σ
such that
vjj
tjSj
1−σ ≈ Xjj. Hence, equations (37) and (39) that represent respectively the
real wages obtained with the final goods exports model and the value-added exports model
are equivalent as suggested theoretically, so as the welfare gains from trade derived with
the two methods. The counterfactual analysis results will render this more explicit.
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4 Counterfactual analysis results
In this section we perform two counterfactual exercises featuring two different trade costs
shocks. The first trade costs shock is a move from 2011 levels of trade openness to autarky
for all the countries in the world, and the second a 20% reduction of the trade costs indexes
regarding African trade flows.15 We first analyse the differences in predictions between our
model based upon value-added exports and a classical model with gross exports allowing
tradable intermediate goods but not sectoral linkages. The welfare formula16 regarding
the latter is a special case of equation 29 in Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) or
equation 7 in Ossa (2015) and is equal to:
ln
ŵi
P̂i
=
−1
σ − 1
(
1− αi
αi
)
ln λ̂iig −
1
σ − 1
ln λ̂iig (61)
Where λiig represents the share of domestic expenditures on gross exports and αi the
value-added to gross output ratio.
4.1 Autarky
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the results regarding the move to autarky. The
detailed results are available in appendix 6.A. This table is composed of five parts, the
first presenting the results for the entire set and the two following respectively for the
countries the less open of the sample and for the most open ones. We define the less open
countries as those who present a ratio of internal trade in value-added over GDP > 77%
and the more open ones as those who present a ratio of internal trade in value-added over
GDP < 60%.
The last two parts of table 1 present respectively the results for the most downstream
countries i.e. with an upstreamness level of less than 1.7, and for the most upstream
countries in the production process with an upstreamness level of more than 2.4 where
the upstreamness level is calculated following Fally and Hillberry (2018). We discuss how
to obtain it in equation (62).
The first two rows in each part of table 1 represent respectively the welfare gains obtained
using the model with gross exports as in equation (61) (W_gross exports) and the welfare
15Unlike the shock related to autarky, the second shock requires to solve the system of equations presented
in section (2.7.2). We do so by using GAMS. The code is available upon request.
16Our welfare formula is as said earlier the change in real wage instead of the change in the economy’s
real expenditures to ensure the comparability with previous studies.
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gains using our approach with value-added exports as equation (41) (W_value-added
exports).
Table 1: The welfare gains of trade (Autarky)
Entire set (Part 1)
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
W_gross exports 139 -11,56% -43,31% -1,88%
W_value-added exports 139 -13,59% -56,70% -2,76%
Gross share of fragmentation (G) 139 50,80% 21,06% 66,71%
Gross share of fragmentation (VA) 139 65,68% 30,64% 96,14%
Net share of fragmentation (VA) 139 21,81% 6,57% 55,70%
Ratio of internal trade in value-added over GDP >0,77 (Part 2)
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
W_gross exports 38 -5,25% -7,42% -1,88%
W_value-added exports 38 -8,33% -28,00% -2,76%
Gross share of fragmentation (G) 38 47,20% 21,06% 66,59%
Gross share of fragmentation (VA) 38 65,88% 35,13% 96,14%
Net share of fragmentation (VA) 38 17,27% 7,45% 35,38%
Ratio of internal trade in value-added over GDP <0,6 (Part 3)
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
W_gross exports 39 -20,08% -43,31% -12,78%
W_value-added exports 39 -19,71% -56,70% -5,02%
Gross share of fragmentation (G) 39 53,22% 29,07% 66,71%
Gross share of fragmentation (VA) 39 67,37% 30,64% 86,91%
Net share of fragmentation (VA) 39 27,85% 7,35% 55,70%
Upstreamness <1.7 (Part 4)
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
W_gross exports 20 -8,46% -21,05% -1,88%
W_value-added exports 20 -17,04% -36,27% -4,72%
Gross share of fragmentation (G) 20 47,05% 21,06% 58,56%
Gross share of fragmentation (VA) 20 61,34% 35,13% 96,14%
Net share of fragmentation (VA) 20 22,10% 7,45% 37,16%
Upstreamness >2.4 (Part 5)
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
W_gross exports 20 -17,94% -35,22% -6,41%
W_value-added exports 20 -12,94% -31,54% -5,02%
Gross share of fragmentation (G) 20 50,43% 29,07% 66,71%
Gross share of fragmentation (VA) 20 60,55% 30,64% 86,91%
Net share of fragmentation (VA) 20 19,85% 7,35% 44,09%
The last three rows in each part of table 1 represent the gross and net shares of the welfare
gains related to international fragmentation. For the model with gross exports (G), the
share is obtained using 1 −
− 1
σ−1
ln λ̂iig
ln
ŵi
P̂i
. For value-added exports (VA), the net share is
obtained using
−1
θ
(
1−αi
αi
)
lnpiii−lnt̂isi
ln
ŵi
P̂i
, and the gross share just
−1
θ
(
1−αi
αi
)
lnpiii
ln
ŵi
P̂i
.
32
As regards the “upstreamness” indexes we follow Fally and Hillberry (2018). They cal-
culate upstreamness indexes for each sector in a country and then obtain the aggregate
country index by computing an export-weighted average of sectoral indexes. To follow
their words, these sectoral indexes measure the distance of each industry from final de-
mand where distance is “the number of stages of production an industry’s output passes
through before reaching final consumers”. As said in the data section, we use an inter-
regional input-output matrix that does not feature sectoral linkages within and between
countries but only aggregate trade linkages, since we aggregated the 57 original sectors
of the GTAP database into a unique sector. Our index is therefore not sectoral, and we
don’t need to apply a weighting scheme to get the aggregate index. More precisely, we
have:
Ui = 1 + ϕiiUi +
∑
i 6=j
ϕijUj (62)
Where Ui is the upstreamness index of country “i” and ϕij denotes the share of output
from country “i” that is needed to produce one unit of output in country “j”.
As the table shows, on average, a move to autarky would reduce real wage by 11,56 % if we
follow the standard model with gross exports, and by 13.59 % if we follow the model with
value-added exports (See the first part of table 1 named “entire set”). These results seem
quite close, however, the correlation between the two models’ results is only 76 %, which
means that there are differences. Among these differences, it appears that the welfare
loss for the countries that are less open is higher by (−5.25− (−8.33)) = 3.08 percentage
points on average with value-added exports than with gross exports, whereas it is just
slightly lower, less than 0.5 percentage points on average for the more open countries (See
respectively the second and the third part of table 1). It means that the gains from trade
are understated for the less open countries when we use the standard gross exports model.
A result that is also worth mentioning is that the welfare gains of trade are higher,
(−8.46− (−17.04)) = 8.58 percentage points on average for the most downstream coun-
tries with the value-added exports model in comparison to the standard gross exports
model (See the fourth part of table 1). On the contrary, the gains for the most upstream
countries are (−12, 94− (−17.94)) = 5 percentage points lower (See the fifth part of table
1). This result relates as said earlier to the work of Fally and Hillberry (2018) who built a
sequential model of international fragmentation and also found that downstream countries
feature higher welfare gains compared to the prediction of a standard model of trade. The
difference is that the model that they use as a benchmark for comparison is a model of
trade without intermediate goods flows. Unlike them, we compare our model predictions
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to a standard trade model featuring intermediate goods flows. This benchmark is the
relevant one because our model allows back and forth trade in intermediate goods unlike
theirs.
Alexander (2017) using a model that distinguishes intermediate and final goods trade
flows, also find similar results regarding the difference between the gains on average in
comparison to the standard trade model, but also as regards the difference between up-
stream and downstream countries. This suggests that the difference between the gains
comes from the assumption regarding intermediate and final goods trade shares.
As regards the net share of fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade, it appears that
this share is not as high as one could expect. To see this, we multiply the net share of
fragmentation in the welfare gains from trade (the fifth row of each part of table 1) with
the estimated total gains by the value-added exports model for each category of countries
be it the entire set or the most upstream countries for example. More precisely, the net
share of fragmentation in the total welfare gains from trade represents 21.81 % on average
of the welfare reduction for the entire set as it is shown in the fifth row of the first part of
the table. On this basis, our model predicts that turning off trade in intermediate goods
would only reduce the average real wage by (21.81 ∗ (13.59)) ≈ 3 percentage points, with
(27.85 ∗ (19.71)) ≈ 5.5 percentage points on average for the more open countries (See
the third part of the table) and (17.27 ∗ (8.33)) ≈ 1.5 percentage point for the less open
countries (See the second part of the table).
Paradoxically, the gross share of the welfare gains related to fragmentation is higher (14.88
percentage points more on average) with our approach compared to the gross exports
approach as it is shown in the rows 3 and 4 of the first part of the table. It represents
65,68% of the total gains with our model compared to 50,80% with the standard model.
There is anyway a striking difference between the gross and net shares of the welfare gains
related to fragmentation. This substantiates the necessity to take into account the trade
costs associated to international fragmentation that would disappear because of autarky
in the calculation of the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains from
trade, as our model allows us to do.
More precisely, because of autarky, the trade costs that are borne when a given country
exports its intermediate goods to intermediate countries and imports them back embed-
ded in the latter final goods exports “tjsj” would not be borne anymore, which attenuates
the welfare losses. The evidence that the gross welfare gains from international fragmen-
tation are high but largely compensated by its costs has a trivial implication: reducing
significantly the cost of fragmentation ceteris paribus could drastically improve the gains
from trade. As shown in section 2.7.2, this seems to be impossible as the change in the
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cost of fragmentation depends on the change in the cost of a bundle of inputs, the change
in the total requirements (the elements of the Leontief inverse) and the change in bilateral
trade costs. All these variables also affect trade flows. As amongst them only bilateral
trade costs are exogeneous, we will analyse what is the impact of a reduction in trade
costs on the cost of fragmentation and on the gains from trade.
4.2 Decrease of African bilateral trade costs
In this section, we simulate the impact of a 20 % decrease on the level of African countries’
direct bilateral trade costs17 which are among the countries with the highest level of trade
costs in the world. We analyse the consequences of this shock in term of welfare, and also
in term of participation in the global supply chain. We both take into consideration the
change in real wage and the change in the economy’s real expenditures.
Table 2 presents the results, with the second column representing the change in real wage,
the third column the change in real expenditures, the fourth column the average change
in the cost of fragmentation, and the last two columns the changes in the inverse internal
cost of fragmentation “ ln t̂jSj
1−σ
” and the internal total requirement ln B̂ii
18 respectively.
As we can expect, a 20 % reduction in the level of African countries’ direct bilateral trade
costs would increase real wage by as much as 22% for small open economies like Togo or
as much as 5 % for relatively closed and large economies like Nigeria. The results are
qualitatively the same when it comes to real expenditures. In term of magnitude, the
change in real expenditures is systematically higher than the change in real wage for all
the countries. This is due to the fact that the economy’s total expenditures is the sum of
labor revenues and tariff revenues as shown in equation (27). These revenues increase as
the countries imports more goods following the decrease in trade costs.19
It is interesting to note that the cost of fragmentation would increase on average. This
result is consistent with what we could expect theoretically. The intermediate goods trade
elasticity is sufficiently lower than the final goods trade elasticity, a critical condition for
this result to occur. Besides, we have only 32 African countries and aggregated regions
for which trade costs decrease.
The remaining others are countries for which bilateral trade costs remain constant except
with their African partners. As they are considered as intermediate countries for African
17The trade costs that are borne when they export or import directly a good from a given country.
18The fraction of local output required by a given country to produce a unit of final good.
19It should be recalled that we imposed that trade imbalances remain constant between equilibria as well
as bilateral tariffs.
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Table 2: The welfare gains of trade (20% decrease of African trade costs)
Countries Real wages
Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
Inverse internal
cost of fragmentation
Internal total
requirement
TGO 20,29% 21,03% 4,90% -14,40% -14,40%
TUN 13,54% 15,61% 5,70% -17,50% -17,50%
MUS 13,02% 13,10% 4,70% -13,10% -13,10%
GIN 12,49% 15,53% 3,60% -11,90% -11,90%
ZMB 12,40% 17,73% 5,30% -23,70% -23,80%
MOZ 11,96% 13,71% 2,70% -14,20% -14,30%
MAR 10,26% 11,06% 6,00% -16,70% -16,70%
BEN 10,07% 16,21% 4,50% -7,40% -7,40%
CIV 9,35% 12,75% 4,10% -14,60% -14,60%
ZWE 9,35% 13,71% 4,20% -12,10% -12,10%
SEN 9,08% 11,15% 4,80% -12,30% -12,30%
NAM 8,98% 12,04% 3,90% -16,10% -16,10%
KEN 8,89% 10,80% 5,50% -14,80% -14,80%
MWI 8,80% 11,42% 4,80% -15,00% -15,00%
GHA 8,34% 10,80% 4,30% -10,80% -10,80%
EGY 8,25% 9,44% 5,30% -15,60% -15,60%
TZA 8,16% 11,15% 4,50% -9,30% -9,30%
MDG 7,79% 9,53% 4,40% -15,00% -15,00%
BWA 7,33% 10,44% 2,60% -11,10% -11,10%
BFA 7,33% 10,53% 2,90% -10,70% -10,70%
UGA 7,23% 9,17% 3,60% -11,60% -11,60%
ZAF 7,05% 8,34% 5,20% -14,10% -14,20%
CMR 6,30% 8,71% 4,20% -11,50% -11,50%
RWA 5,64% 7,05% 3,10% -8,50% -8,50%
NGA 5,07% 7,23% 1,40% -5,00% -5,00%
ETH 4,59% 6,58% 4,20% -7,70% -7,70%
value-added exports, the increase in the average cost of fragmentation makes even more
sense. There are however instances where the bilateral cost of fragmentation decreases,
especially for intra-African trade. This is natural since the trade costs of intermediate
countries with African ones do decrease. Appendix 6.B presents detailed results for the
change in the bilateral cost of fragmentation regarding Cameroon. We also include a case
where the trade elasticity for intermediate goods is higher (7.25) than the trade elasticity
for final goods (4.85). In this case, the cost of fragmentation would decrease on average,
which confirms our theoretical results.
We presented this cost of fragmentation in section 2.4 as a function of the relative price
between the indirectly exported flows over directly exported ones. If this cost increases
for a given country, it becomes relatively more expensive for this country to indirectly
export goods through intermediate countries than directly exporting final goods to end
consumers.
The chart below suggests that this is the case for our set of African countries. This chart
presents different measures of integration in the global supply chain. We can for instance
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Figure 3: Participation of selected countries in the global supply chain
see in the upper panel of the chart that indirectly exported flows grow, which means that
the countries’ forward participation in the global supply chain increase in absolute terms,
but these flows grow less than the directly exported ones (final goods exports), which is
consistent with our previous result. It means that the countries moved to downstream
stages of the production process, at least in relative terms. Another way to see it is to
analyze the growth of backward participation that is shown in the lower panel of the
chart. As it becomes cheaper to import intermediate inputs, the countries import more of
them, everything that increases their backward participation20 in the global supply chain.
The last result that highlights table 2 is the exact similarity between the variation of
the internal cost of fragmentation and the fraction of local output required to produce
a unit of final good in country “i” (internal total requirement). This result confirms our
previous finding that the internal cost of fragmentation could be approximated by the
latter, which makes possible the calculation of the share of international fragmentation in
the gains from trade against autarky using only observable data.
20In this chart backward integration is represented by the share of foreign output required to produce a
unit of final good.
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5 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper was to propose a trade model for the determination of the net share
of international fragmentation in the welfare gains of trade. To do so, we relied upon value-
added exports as the variable of interest instead of gross exports. It allowed us to highlight
the macroeconomic cost of fragmentation, a critical variable for the computation of this
net share.
Our model predicts that the net share of international fragmentation in the welfare gains
of trade is not as high as one could expect, at least in comparison to the gross share that
could be inferred from a classical model. It represents only 22% on average of the gains
of trade. As the model allows us to deduct from the gross welfare loss that would imply
the shutdown of international fragmentation the cost of fragmentation that would not be
supported anymore in its absence, the net welfare loss is thus reduced.
We also show that using our framework to derive the welfare gains of trade in comparison
to a standard trade model based upon gross exports give different results. This is due as
explained Alexander (2017) to the implicit assumption made by standard trade models
that the share of intermediate goods sourced from a given origin country in the total
demand of intermediate goods of a given destination country is equivalent to the share
of final goods sourced from this origin country in the total demand of final goods of the
destination country. Specifically, we show that the reduction in real wage that a move to
autarky would provoke is lower using our approach than the traditional one for upstream
countries, and higher for downstream countries and countries that are less open in terms of
the imports in value-added penetration ratio. The gains from trade are thus understated
by the classical model for this last category even if they remain way lower than the gains
associated to the more open countries with our model.
Finally, we show that reducing the level of a country’s bilateral trade costs with its trading
partners does not necessarily imply more forward participation in the global supply chain.
In fact, unless the reduction in trade costs affects more the indirectly exported flows than
the directly exported ones, the increase in exports would be biased towards the latter,
which implies a weaker forward participation in relative terms to the global production
network. Backward integration, however, undoubtedly increase, and the countries are
closer to the final consumers than before. This result has interesting implications in term
of trade policies since increasing the participation in the global supply chain is a key
concern for many countries.
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6 Appendices
6.A Detailed results, trade and welfare
Autarky 20 % decrease African trade costs
Country
Real wage
benchmark
Real wage
value-added
exports
Real wage
(VA)
(VA) Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
TGO -16,82% -36,27% 20,28% 21,05% 4,91%
ZMB -16,37% -12,65% 12,41% 17,71% 5,33%
TUN -13,44% -15,72% 13,57% 15,59% 5,65%
MUS -12,20% -16,40% 12,98% 13,12% 4,65%
MOZ -11,96% -14,79% 11,97% 13,75% 2,74%
CIV -11,48% -9,13% 9,32% 12,74% 4,15%
NAM -11,40% -8,47% 9,03% 12,08% 3,90%
BWA -10,43% -6,39% 7,35% 10,40% 2,60%
GIN -10,43% -18,30% 12,48% 15,54% 3,64%
BFA -9,42% -6,74% 7,30% 10,56% 2,87%
MAR -9,05% -13,14% 10,29% 11,03% 6,05%
MWI -8,67% -10,58% 8,78% 11,41% 4,84%
MDG -7,89% -8,61% 7,79% 9,57% 4,44%
ZAF -7,27% -7,78% 7,01% 8,37% 5,18%
SEN -7,20% -14,47% 9,06% 11,15% 4,82%
GHA -7,15% -11,08% 8,34% 10,79% 4,31%
UGA -7,14% -8,11% 7,23% 9,19% 3,61%
ZWE -6,84% -14,99% 9,30% 13,74% 4,15%
TZA -6,43% -11,00% 8,13% 11,14% 4,46%
NGA -6,37% -4,72% 5,09% 7,19% 1,44%
KEN -6,24% -13,31% 8,85% 10,76% 5,49%
EGY -6,17% -10,69% 8,23% 9,42% 5,28%
BEN -5,73% -28,00% 10,09% 16,18% 4,55%
RWA -5,71% -6,13% 5,66% 7,06% 3,09%
CMR -5,16% -7,29% 6,29% 8,73% 4,20%
ETH -3,28% -6,98% 4,58% 6,56% 4,19%
LUX -44,00% -56,70% 0,37% 0,30% 1,31%
IRL -35,78% -25,30% 0,31% 0,64% 1,42%
MLT -32,59% -50,98% 0,46% 0,17% 1,23%
SGP -31,27% -31,54% 0,31% 0,50% 1,40%
41
Continued from previous page
Autarky 20 % decrease African trade costs
Country
Real wage
benchmark
Real wage
value-added
exports
Real wage
(VA)
(VA) Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
XCA -26,44% -21,59% 4,23% 8,44% 1,52%
HUN -25,84% -24,96% 0,20% 0,25% 1,05%
TTO -23,75% -12,26% 1,05% 1,06% 0,84%
KHM -23,66% -27,06% 0,00% -0,04% 1,18%
MYS -23,59% -21,58% 0,35% 0,47% 1,36%
BEL -23,13% -28,66% 0,63% 0,58% 1,35%
SVK -22,95% -24,41% 0,10% 0,09% 1,34%
VNM -22,34% -29,64% 0,29% 0,22% 0,96%
TWN -22,11% -18,50% 0,22% 0,29% 1,19%
EST -21,77% -27,24% 0,39% 0,34% 1,50%
MNG -21,39% -23,43% 0,06% 0,04% 1,45%
THA -21,25% -21,61% 0,37% 0,41% 0,93%
KWT -20,96% -8,40% 0,28% 0,86% 1,06%
CZE -20,78% -20,37% 0,14% 0,17% 1,25%
OMN -18,79% -11,01% 0,20% 0,33% 0,99%
HKG -18,11% -19,55% 0,27% 0,29% 1,44%
SVN -18,08% -21,45% 0,23% 0,21% 1,36%
BGR -17,57% -21,41% 0,29% 0,27% 1,25%
XWF -16,83% -33,37% 20,11% 20,58% 5,33%
SAU -16,78% -8,93% 0,34% 0,65% 0,75%
QAT -16,70% -5,02% 0,08% 0,38% 1,16%
BHR -16,65% -14,19% 0,77% 1,20% 0,22%
BRN -16,29% -9,35% 0,06% 0,12% 1,32%
LTU -16,13% -21,56% 0,32% 0,24% 1,38%
CRI -16,08% -13,66% 0,06% 0,08% 1,30%
NIC -15,54% -16,81% 0,36% 0,34% 1,28%
XCF -15,43% -9,36% 10,94% 19,58% 3,66%
AZE -15,41% -7,57% 0,06% 0,18% 1,33%
CYP -15,00% -22,91% 0,43% 0,32% 1,18%
PAN -14,85% -30,60% 0,12% 0,01% 1,21%
XEF -14,39% -16,88% 0,36% 0,35% 1,25%
CHE -14,20% -12,60% 0,38% 0,45% 1,22%
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Autarky 20 % decrease African trade costs
Country
Real wage
benchmark
Real wage
value-added
exports
Real wage
(VA)
(VA) Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
AUT -14,07% -15,05% 0,15% 0,16% 1,26%
HND -13,94% -15,46% 0,01% 0,00% 1,33%
XNA -13,81% -22,59% 0,60% 0,38% 1,44%
XAC -13,70% -8,59% 9,73% 15,27% 2,58%
DNK -13,66% -13,71% 0,18% 0,21% 1,27%
UKR -13,41% -15,42% 0,28% 0,29% 1,42%
ARE -13,28% -15,14% 0,32% 0,31% 1,10%
KOR -13,04% -14,26% 0,26% 0,39% 1,33%
NLD -12,99% -12,06% 0,34% 0,39% 1,20%
KGZ -12,78% -32,67% 0,07% -0,04% 1,36%
LVA -12,26% -18,85% 0,18% 0,11% 1,45%
XSC -11,98% -8,36% 9,16% 12,48% 4,40%
JOR -11,96% -23,00% 0,64% 0,43% 1,23%
SWE -11,73% -11,04% 0,19% 0,23% 1,06%
DEU -11,66% -10,96% 0,22% 0,25% 1,08%
BLR -11,59% -18,50% 0,24% 0,13% 1,49%
XOC -11,49% -18,40% 0,11% 0,03% 1,36%
XEA -11,28% -8,97% 0,15% 0,21% 1,30%
XWS -10,95% -9,19% 0,27% 0,29% 1,19%
KAZ -10,80% -6,40% 0,06% 0,09% 1,43%
XSM -10,75% -11,61% 0,28% 0,29% 1,40%
XEE -10,73% -25,82% 0,21% 0,06% 1,47%
HRV -10,55% -11,67% 0,17% 0,18% 1,09%
LAO -10,22% -13,04% 0,03% 0,00% 1,22%
POL -10,11% -12,34% 0,11% 0,10% 1,34%
FIN -10,00% -10,79% 0,15% 0,15% 1,10%
XSU -9,97% -8,03% 0,06% 0,09% 1,30%
ROU -9,78% -12,11% 0,16% 0,13% 1,07%
NOR -9,62% -7,46% 0,10% 0,21% 1,34%
CHL -9,50% -8,78% 0,07% 0,10% 1,23%
JAM -9,42% -15,72% 0,14% 0,09% 1,25%
ALB -9,29% -15,95% 0,17% 0,14% 1,39%
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Autarky 20 % decrease African trade costs
Country
Real wage
benchmark
Real wage
value-added
exports
Real wage
(VA)
(VA) Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
PRT -9,22% -11,13% 0,70% 0,67% 1,17%
ISR -8,71% -10,28% 0,14% 0,15% 1,37%
PRY -8,45% -10,20% 0,16% 0,15% 1,03%
XNF -8,44% -6,98% 7,11% 9,42% 2,78%
IRN -8,35% -5,12% 0,12% 0,26% 0,93%
XCB -7,92% -10,85% 0,88% 0,85% 1,20%
MEX -7,90% -7,36% 0,03% 0,03% 1,23%
PHL -7,77% -10,63% 0,03% 0,02% 1,20%
SLV -7,68% -11,64% 0,04% 0,04% 1,23%
NZL -7,55% -7,07% 0,16% 0,19% 1,00%
GRC -7,54% -12,06% 0,23% 0,18% 1,34%
BOL -7,46% -7,96% 0,07% 0,07% 1,31%
ESP -7,27% -8,45% 0,40% 0,39% 1,20%
GBR -7,23% -9,11% 0,22% 0,21% 1,07%
ECU -7,16% -7,89% 0,02% 0,03% 1,28%
PER -7,13% -5,64% 0,10% 0,11% 1,14%
ITA -7,12% -7,87% 0,29% 0,27% 1,11%
GTM -7,11% -8,91% 0,04% 0,03% 1,25%
CAN -6,98% -7,05% 0,08% 0,09% 1,37%
FRA -6,84% -7,94% 0,34% 0,33% 1,02%
CHN -6,51% -5,98% 0,22% 0,26% 1,02%
BGD -6,50% -7,91% 0,09% 0,10% 1,10%
VEN -6,50% -4,37% 0,00% 0,00% 1,37%
XEC -6,40% -6,92% 6,31% 8,96% 3,50%
DOM -6,37% -9,09% 0,09% 0,09% 1,20%
URY -6,15% -7,14% 0,18% 0,19% 1,18%
IDN -6,14% -5,91% 0,09% 0,10% 1,12%
RUS -6,11% -5,18% 0,07% 0,10% 1,31%
XER -5,94% -9,24% 0,21% 0,17% 1,22%
GEO -5,61% -14,57% 0,19% 0,10% 1,57%
TUR -5,61% -8,46% 0,39% 0,34% 1,38%
LKA -5,18% -9,18% 0,06% 0,08% 1,07%
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Autarky 20 % decrease African trade costs
Country
Real wage
benchmark
Real wage
value-added
exports
Real wage
(VA)
(VA) Real
expenditures
Cost of
fragmentation
AUS -5,18% -4,68% 0,07% 0,08% 1,21%
ARM -4,73% -9,96% 0,06% 0,01% 1,41%
IND -4,62% -7,47% 0,38% 0,40% 1,19%
ARG -4,40% -3,74% 0,13% 0,18% 0,75%
XSA -4,25% -12,85% 0,13% 0,15% 1,30%
COL -4,14% -4,27% 0,03% 0,03% 1,19%
XSE -3,89% -5,61% 0,04% 0,02% 1,14%
JPN -3,61% -3,96% 0,06% 0,06% 1,02%
PAK -3,46% -6,36% 0,16% 0,16% 0,69%
PRI -3,05% -4,45% 0,15% 0,15% 1,33%
USA -2,84% -4,05% 0,12% 0,12% 1,21%
BRA -2,76% -2,76% 0,11% 0,12% 0,86%
NPL -1,91% -6,92% 0,04% 0,06% 1,30%
6.B Change in the bilateral cost of fragmentation (Cameroon)
Countries
θ = 4.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
θ = 7.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
ALB 5.45% -5.85%
ARE 4.34% -1.99%
ARG 3.56% 0.24%
ARM 5.4% -6.01%
AUS 3.36% -0.85%
AUT 5.54% -5.86%
AZE 5.43% -5.99%
BEL 5.76% -5.47%
BEN -0.95% -1.55%
BFA 4.3% 3,00%
BGD 2.7% 3.15%
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Countries
θ = 4.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
θ = 7.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
BGR 5.59% -5.8%
BHR 6,00% -5.64%
BLR 3.51% 0.34%
BOL 5.39% -6.11%
BRA 5.25% -6.22%
BRN 3.36% 0.98%
BWA 4.37% -8.18%
CAN 3.2% 0.58%
CHE 4.06% -1.62%
CHL 3.45% 0.54%
CHN 5.11% -6.44%
CIV 1.11% -2.02%
CMR 2.37% 4.38%
COL 5.35% -6.07%
CRI 5.34% -6.05%
CYP 5.69% -5.63%
CZE 3.96% -0.75%
DEU 5.16% -4.86%
DNK 3.4% 1.06%
DOM 2.9% 2.43%
ECU 5.26% -6.14%
EGY 9.56% 1.47%
ESP 5.74% -5.43%
EST 5.58% -5.76%
ETH -0.54% -9.23%
FIN 5.48% -5.99%
FRA 5.65% -5.67%
GBR 5.51% -5.86%
GEO 5.36% -6.05%
GHA 0.59% 0.85%
GIN -1.36% -9.11%
GRC 5.42% -5.89%
GTM 5.3% -6.1%
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Countries
θ = 4.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
θ = 7.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
HKG 5.37% -5.91%
HND 5.33% -6.06%
HRV 5.54% -5.93%
HUN 5.53% -5.9%
IDN 5.28% -6.15%
IND 5.45% -5.71%
IRL 5.59% -5.74%
IRN 4.34% -2.75%
ISR 5.47% -5.87%
ITA 5.56% -5.75%
JAM 5.41% -6,00%
JOR 5.53% -5.69%
JPN 5.31% -6.17%
KAZ 3.43% 0.57%
KEN 4.28% -3.18%
KGZ 3.57% -0.14%
KHM 3.9% -0.78%
KOR 5.48% -5.99%
KWT 5.42% -6.05%
LAO 3.98% -0.94%
LKA 5.35% -6.04%
LTU 5.47% -5.9%
LUX 3.19% 1.9%
LVA 5.52% -5.9%
MAR -0.56% -2.3%
MDG -1.5% -5.05%
MEX 5.3% -6.07%
MLT 5.62% -5.75%
MNG 3.5% 0.25%
MOZ 1.8% -6.8%
MUS -0.25% -1.16%
MWI 5.18% -3.6%
MYS 5.47% -5.95%
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Countries
θ = 4.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
θ = 7.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
NAM -2.06% -7.2%
NGA -2.18% -5.96%
NIC 5.47% -6.04%
NLD 5.66% -5.66%
NOR 5.45% -6,00%
NPL 5.34% -5.97%
NZL 3.36% 0.83%
OMN 3.29% 1.02%
PAK 5.34% -6.11%
PAN 3.72% -0.37%
PER 4.57% -7.05%
PHL 5.35% -6.09%
POL 5.45% -5.97%
PRI 5.01% -6.37%
PRT 6,00% -5.29%
PRY 3.41% 0.77%
QAT 5.43% -6.04%
ROU 5.53% -5.89%
RUS 5.39% -6.08%
RWA 1.66% -8.77%
SAU 5.52% -5.94%
SEN 1.57% 1.23%
SGP 5.47% -5.94%
SLV 5.3% -6.09%
SVK 5.46% -5.96%
SVN 5.54% -5.81%
SWE 5.55% -5.9%
TGO -1.25% -2.59%
THA 5.55% -5.89%
TTO -1.15% -12.49%
TUN 0.18% -0.81%
TUR 5.6% -5.62%
TWN 4.17% -4.95%
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Countries
θ = 4.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
θ = 7.25 and
σ − 1 = 4.85
TZA -1.44% -10.25%
UGA 5.44% -3.38%
UKR 5.46% -6,00%
URY 2.85% -1.24%
USA 5.16% -6.3%
VEN 3.47% 0.5%
VNM 5.5% -5.89%
XAC 12.61% 2.88%
XCA 7.37% -4.93%
XCB 5.97% -5.96%
XCF 4.96% 4.09%
XEA 5.45% -6.03%
XEC -3.83% -8.85%
XEE 3.61% 0.22%
XEF 5.62% -5.72%
XER 5.5% -5.96%
XNA 3.36% 0.83%
XNF 1.83% -3.34%
XOC 3.65% -0.03%
XSA 5.14% -6.2%
XSE 5.38% -6.13%
XSC -2.1% -5.3%
XSM 5.37% -5.97%
XSU 5.36% -6.11%
XWF 8.69% 5.08%
XWS 5.36% -5.97%
ZAF -3.64% -10.2%
ZMB 9.52% -1.52%
ZWE 2.17% -4.03%
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6.C A two-country inter-country input output table
Intermediate use Final Demand
Gross output Trade Balance
Country j Country i Country j Country i
Country j hjj hji xjj xji Gj =
∑
i=j (hji + xji) Dj =
∑
i (hij + xij)−
∑
i (hji + xji)
Country i hij hii xij xii Gi =
∑
j=i (hij + xij) Di =
∑
j (hji + xji)−
∑
j (hij + xij)
Total Hj =
∑
i=j hij Hi =
∑
j=i hji
Ej =
∑
i=j xij
= Xj −R
F
j
= wjLj + R
I
j + Dj
Ei =
∑
j=i xji
= Xi −R
F
i
= wiLi + R
I
i + Di
Custom duties and tax RIj =
∑
i=j τ
I
ij hij R
I
i =
∑
j=i τ
I
ji hji R
F
j =
∑
i=j τ
F
ij xij R
F
i =
∑
j=i τ
f
ji xji
Value-added wjLj =
∑S
s=j
∑
i αjsXsi wiLi =
∑S
s=i
∑
j αisXsj wjLj = Xj −R
F
j −R
I
j −Dj wiLi = Xi −R
F
i −R
I
i −Di
Gross output
Gj = Hj +R
I
j + wjLj
=
∑
i=j hij
(
1 + τ Iij
)
+ wjLj
Gi = Hi +R
I
i + wiLi
=
∑
j=i hji
(
1 + τ Iji
)
+ wiLi
Gj = Hj + Ej −Dj Gi = Hi + Ei −Di
With {i, j} = S
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